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Abstract 
The Revenue Rule, a common law rule from British court 
systems, prevents foreign countries from bringing claims in the 
United States to enforce or adjudicate tax claims that did not 
happen in the United States.  The United States Supreme Court in 
Pasquantino v. United States held that Canada’s right to collect 
imported liquor taxes was not barred by the Revenue Rule.  
However, the Second Circuit in European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco Inc., ruled the European Union and Colombia could not 
recover lost tax money or enforcement costs from cigarette 
smuggling under RICO because of the Revenue Rule.  The 
European Community petitioned the Supreme Court.  After 
accepting the Community’s petition, the Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded the case back to the Second Circuit to be reheard in 
light of Pasquantino.  The Second Circuit did not change its ruling 
citing Pasquantino as a criminal case brought by the U.S. 
government.  With no distinction between criminal and civil RICO 
cases in current jurisdiction, this comment seeks to provide a 
solution to the split between the Second Circuit and the Supreme 
Court.  This comment argues in favor of limitations being placed 
on the Revenue Rule so that it can never trump RICO claims in 
United States courts.  In the alternative it argues if limitations 
cannot be placed upon the Revenue Rule then the only option is 
abolition.  Lastly this comment provides that if limitations and 
abolition are not the answer, then foreign countries should appeal 
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to the United States government to bring the RICO claims on their 
behalf. 
 
Introduction 
 “[W]ith liberty and justice for all.”1  But does all just mean 
for Americans?  What about other countries?  Do they not have the 
right to seek justice within the borders of the United States?  If a 
person smuggles tobacco, liquor, or drugs on American soil, they 
are punished through American court systems.  What if an 
American citizen or company does the same in another country?  
The Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) allows foreign countries to bring suit in America for illegal 
acts committed by American citizens.
2
  Unfortunately for these 
foreign countries, a common law rule
3
 denies them the remedies 
they seek.
4
  The Revenue Rule bars foreign RICO claims because 
of an almost 300 year old common law doctrine
5
 which states that 
“no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.”6  
This is an injustice on the part of American justice systems by 
denying the enforcement of a federally mandated statute to 
accommodate a common law ruling which has yet to be codified in 
any way. 
                                                 
1
 4 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West 2002) (emphasis added). 
2
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West 1970). 
3
 Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-
First Century, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L 79, (2006). 
4
 Id. at 83. 
5
 Id. at 79.  First appearance of the rule is Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, 145 Eng. 
Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729) Id. at 80. 
6
 Id. at 81 (citing Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775)). 
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 This Comment will give a brief background on the 
Revenue Rule as well as the RICO act and how the two have 
interacted in the legal community.  This Comment will then argue 
that the Revenue Rule should be limited in scope so that it no 
longer bars any RICO claims brought by foreign countries.  This 
limitation can be accomplished in two ways: (1) Never allowing 
the Revenue Rule to trump RICO claims or (2) Completely 
abolishing the Revenue Rule and allowing America to interpret 
foreign countries’ tax laws.  In the alternative, this Comment 
argues that if the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted, (3) foreign 
countries should appeal to the United States government to bring 
these claims on their behalf. 
I. Background 
A. The Revenue Rule 
 The Revenue Rule was first adopted in eighteenth century 
British courts.
7
  Since then it has grown and developed into a 
method for “courts to decline to entertain[] suits or enforce[e] 
foreign tax judgments or foreign revenue laws.”8  A 1729 case is 
the earliest sighting of the Revenue Rule.
9
  Following that case, 
Holman v. Johnson
10
 brought about Lord Mansfield’s famous 
statement, “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of 
another.”11  The series of early Revenue Rule cases all supported 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 79. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. at 80 (citing Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729)). 
10
 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B 1775). 
11
 Mallinak, supra note 3, at 81. 
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the premises that one nation does not take notice of the revenue 
laws of another
12
, but these cases provided no rationale for the 
decisions of the court.  These cases dealt with smuggled tea, 
illegally exported gold, and false shipping documents. With the 
recent rise of alcohol and cigarette smuggling, these cases are 
particularly interesting in United States courts when foreign 
countries bring criminal and civil actions only to have the Revenue 
Rule used as a defense.
13
 
 The United States first considered the Revenue Rule in 
1806 with the Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer
14
 case.
15
  The Revenue 
Rule mostly appeared in disputes where “individual states sought 
enforcement of tax levies against sister states.”16  Moore v. 
                                                 
12
 See generally Lutwydge, 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 1729), Bourcher v. 
Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 55 (K.B. 1734), Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775), 
Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (K.B. 1779). 
13
 Mallinak, supra note 3 at 83. 
14
 1 Johns. 93 (N.Y. 1806). In this case, Ludlow sought enforcement of a 
promissory note issued by Van Rensselaer. Malllinak, supra note 3, at 83. 
Though the note was issued in Paris and did not bear the stamp required by 
French law, “Van Rensselaer resided in New York, and the note was to be paid 
in New York.” Id. The Court ruled in favor of Ludlow. Ludlow, 1 Johns. at 96. 
15
 Mallinak, supra note 3, at 83. The New York Supreme Court relied on 
Holman v. Johnson and held “we do not sit here to enforce the revenue laws of 
another country, it is perfectly immaterial, in a suit before us, whether or not the 
note was stamped according to the laws of France.” Id. at 83-84 (citing Ludlow 
v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 93, 95 (N.Y. 1806)). The New York court did not 
allow Rensselaer to default on the note “based on a defense that a foreign 
revenue provision was violated.” Id. at 84. 
16
 Id. States “generally were reluctant to involve themselves in the enforcement 
or evaluation of sister state tax laws.” Id. The New York court held “it is a 
principle universally recognized that the revenue laws of one country have no 
force in another” when “Maryland and the City of Baltimore sought 
enforcement of a judgment entered by the highest court in Maryland from a New 
York resident.” Id. 
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Mitchell
17
 involved Moore, a treasurer in Indiana, bringing a suit in 
New York “to recover taxes alleged to be due and unpaid . . .” 
against the “executors of the last will and testament of Richard 
Edwards Breed, who allegedly resided in [Indiana].”18  Judge 
Manton dismissed the action citing the Revenue Rule.
19
 
 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, courts today 
interpret and recognize the Revenue Rule as a means to decline 
jurisdiction over cases brought by foreign governments without an 
agreement between that country and the United States.  This led to 
the Revenue Rule being recently used as a defense in foreign 
RICO cases.
20
 
B. RICO 
 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
was enacted in 1970.
21
  It outlaws a list of racketeering activities 
that includes: financial institution fraud, fraud in foreign labor 
contracting, interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion, and 
trafficking in contraband cigarettes.
22
  It originally limited civil 
                                                 
17
 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929). 
18
 Mallinak, supra note 3, at 85 (citing Moore, 30 F.2d at 601 (2d Cir. 1929)). 
19
 Id. An “effort by Indiana to collect taxes in New York [is] ‘repugnant to the 
settled principles of private international law, which preclude one state from 
acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its penal or 
revenue laws as such. The revenue laws of one state have no force in another.” 
Id. (citing Moore, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929)). 
20
 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); Att'y Gen. of Canada v. 
R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004); European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005). 
21
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (2013) (Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970). 
22
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(b) (2013). 
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remedies in the first proposed Senate bill,
23
 “but the House added a 
treble-damages remedy modeled on section 4 of the Clayton 
Act.”24  Since the 1970’s, the law has changed to the current law, 
updated as recently as March 2013.
25
 
 RICO brings a criminal punishment of a fine and/or twenty 
years to life in prison depending on the severity of the crime.
26
  
Under civil remedies, a person convicted of RICO crimes can be 
divested of any interest in any enterprise and a restriction on any 
“future activities or investments of any person including . . . 
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor 
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate 
or foreign commerce . . . .”27  A plaintiff must show he was injured 
by a criminal RICO violation.  To show a violation occurred, the 
plaintiff must identify the previous commission of a crime 
specified in the RICO statute.
28
  There are also certain defined 
terms that must exist to bring a civil RICO claim.
29
  RICO claims 
must be brought before any district court in the United States “in 
                                                 
23
 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 3 (3rd ed. 2010) 
(citing S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)). 
24
 Id. (citing H.R. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 35, 363-64 
(1970)). 
25
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (2013). 
26
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (2009). 
27
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (1995). 
28
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (2013) (defining racketeering activity). 
29
 Randy D. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion:  RICO’s Recent Trips to the United 
States Supreme Court, 85 TUL. L. REV. 677, 679 (2011).  These terms are listed 
in § 1963 of the act and defined in § 1961. 
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which [the defendant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts 
his affairs.”30 
 The implication of RICO cases brought by foreign 
countries has been a point of contention in United States courts 
recently.
31
  Cases have been brought before the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court by foreign 
countries seeking remedies under RICO.  Most of these cases deal 
with the smuggling of cigarettes or alcohol.  Because these suits 
are being brought by foreign governments, the courts are being 
forced to consider RICO and how it interacts with the Revenue 
Rule. 
C. A Tango Between Titans 
1. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 
Inc. 
 Filed by the Attorney General of Canada, this action sought 
damages under RICO “based on lost tax revenue and additional 
law enforcement costs.”32  In 1991, Canada doubled the taxes on 
cigarettes.
33
  To circumvent the Canadian cigarette taxes, R.J. 
Reynolds smuggled cigarettes across the Canadian border.
34
  To do 
                                                 
30
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (1970). 
31
 See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 
424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005). 
32
 268 F.3d at 105 (2d Cir. 2001). Defendants to the action included: RJR-
MacDonald, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company, Northern Brands International, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
International, Inc., and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company PR. Id. at 106. 
33
 Id. at 106. 
34
 Id. at 105. These cigarettes were then sold on the black market. Id. 
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this, Reynolds “exported cigarettes from Canada to the United 
States,” falsely declaring to Canadian border patrol that the 
cigarettes were not for consumption in Canada.
35
  Reynolds then 
sold the merchandise to known smugglers, who then sold the 
cigarettes to black market distributors and smuggled the cigarettes 
back into Canada.
36
  In 1992, Canada imposed a second cigarette 
tax on exported cartons of cigarettes.
37
  Defendants then began 
shipping “raw Canadian tobacco to Puerto Rico, where RJR PR 
manufactured Canadian-style cigarettes made to look as if they had 
been made by RJR-MacDonald in Canada.”38  R.J. Reynolds 
utilized “United States mails and wires to make payments and to 
place and receive orders.”39 
 Canada brought a civil RICO action as it “is a broadly 
worded statue that ‘has as its purpose the elimination of infiltration 
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations 
operating in interstate commerce.’”40  The New York Northern 
                                                 
35
 Id. at 106. 
36
 Id. at 106-07. Some of the smugglers consisted of residents of the St. 
Regis/Akwesasne Indian Reservation. Id. R.J. Reynolds and the smugglers took 
advantage of the Foreign Trade Zones in upstate New York. Id. (Definition of 
Foreign Trade Zone found in the Foreign Trade Zone Act of 1996 19 U.S.C.A. § 
81a). 
37
 Id. at 107. 
38
 Id. RJR PR made and shipped almost one billion Canadian style cigarettes 
from 1992 to 1993. Id. “To conceal their relationship with smugglers, 
defendants created NBI and directed their Canadian sales through it.” Id.  
39
 Id. “In 1997 and 1998, the United States indicted NBI and 21 individuals in 
connection with these smuggling activities.” Id. “Several individuals involved in 
the scheme pled guilty to . . . wire fraud, aiding and abetting smuggling, 
conspiring to defraud the United States, currency violations, money laundering, 
and criminal RICO violations.” Id. 
40
 Id. (citing Senate Report Number 91-617, at 76 (1969)). 
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District Court found that Canada fell into the category of a person 
entitled to bring a RICO claim, but granted R.J. Reynolds motion 
to dismiss the complaint stating the Revenue Rule barred the 
claim.
41
  To prove it suffered an injury, Canada would “have to 
prove, and the Court will have to pass on, the validity of Canadian 
revenue laws and their applicability hereto and the court would be, 
in essence, enforcing Canadian revenue laws.  “Enforcing foreign 
revenue laws is precisely the type of meddling in foreign affairs 
the Revenue Rule forbids.”42  The court also noted the treaty 
between the United States and Canada “with respect to the 
recognition and enforcement of certain tax liabilities.”43 
 Canada appealed this decision to the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals arguing the inapplicability of the Revenue Rule.  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that the 
Revenue Rule and the treaty with the United States barred 
Canada’s civil RICO claims.44  Judge Katzmann, writing for the 
majority, listed the reasons for affirming the lower court’s 
                                                 
41
 Id. at 108. The district court judge refused “to dismiss the action under the act-
of-state and political-question doctrines. Id. The court also denied the claim 
because “a government’s claim for damages based on increased law 
enforcement and related costs does not satisfy civil RICO’s requirement that the 
plaintiff suffer an injury to its commercial interests; and that RICO does not 
provide for disgorgement and other equitable relief requested by Canada.” Id. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. at 108.  This treaty delineated “the extent to which one country’s revenue 
claims may be enforced in the other, and to limit such enforcement to ‘finally 
determined’ revenue claims.” 
44
 Id. at 106. 
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decision:  Respect for sovereignty
45
 and judicial role and 
competence.
46
  The decision also addresses criticism of the 
Revenue Rule
47
 and the interaction of RICO and the Revenue 
Rule.
48
  The majority asserts a difference between civil and 
criminal RICO claims.
49
  Before concluding, the Court discussed 
the implications of Canada arguing for the direct or indirect 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 111.  The Revenue Rule “prevents foreign sovereigns from asserting 
their sovereignty within the borders of other nations, thereby helping nations 
maintain their mutual respect and security.” 
46
 The Court wrote, “The conduct of foreign relations is committed largely to the 
Executive Branch, with power in the Legislative Branch to, inter alia, ratify 
treaties with foreign sovereigns.” Id. at 114. “Extraterritorial tax enforcement 
directly implicates relations between our country and other sovereign nations. 
When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement 
of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues . . . better 
handled—by the political branches of the government.” Id.  
47
 Id. at 124-26. The rule is obsolete “in an age when . . . instantaneous transfer 
of assets can be easily arranged.” Id., at 125 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 483, Reporter’s Note 2 (1987)). “It is not 
clear why difficulties in proving or interpreting foreign law would be any greater 
[with revenue laws] than in other civil suits involving foreign laws.” Id. (citing 
Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal & 
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
663, 668-69 (1967)).  Forum non conveniens . . . remains applicable. Id. (citing 
Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal & 
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
663, 668-69 (1967)).  The act-of-state doctrine contradicts the Revenue Rule by 
stating “a court presumes the validity of a foreign state’s laws within that state’s 
territory.” Id. at 126. 
48
 Id. at 126-30.  Canada argued the lower court should not have dismissed the 
case without “carefully examining [RICO’s] structure, purpose, and policies 
before applying common law rules to restrict or modify . . .” Id. at 126. The 
Second Circuit found that “the Revenue Rule is a doctrine with continuing 
force” and that Canada could not “show that RICO bars the application of the 
Revenue Rule.” Id.  RICO did not clearly abrogate the Revenue Rule and, 
therefore, it can be barred by the Revenue Rule.  Id. at 127-28. 
49
 Id. at 123. “[W]ith regard to the Revenue Rule, there is a critical difference 
between this civil suit brought by a foreign sovereign and the criminal actions 
previously considered by panel of this court.” See Attorney General of Canada 
v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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enforcement of its foreign tax laws under the Revenue Rule.
50
  The 
Second Circuit concluded the Revenue Rule barred Canada’s 
RICO claim and the lower court was correct in dismissing the 
action.
51
 
 Judge Calabresi wrote a dissenting opinion arguing the 
Revenue Rule did not bar Canada’s claim.52  He stressed the 
Restatement
53
 and argued that Canadian tax laws are only 
indirectly related to the action.
54
  He rebutted the argument of 
sovereign interests, explaining that in order to further American 
sovereign interests “we are bound to entertain suits brought under 
federal statutes, and to award the damages that such statutes 
establish.”55  The arguments of separation of power and court 
                                                 
50
 Id. at 130-34. Canada brought a claim for the court “to assess and adjudicate 
the application of Canadian tax laws to wrongdoing alleged in its complaint,” 
not “the enforcement of a final, fully adjudicated Canadian tax judgment.” Id. at 
130. To find if a claim is direct or indirect the court “must look to the ‘object’ of 
the claim.” Id. at 131. “Indirect enforcement occurs where a foreign State (or its 
nominee) in form seeks a remedy, not based on the foreign rule in question, but 
which in substance is designed to give it extra-territorial effect.” Id. (citing 
Albert Venn Dicey, J.H.C. Morris, & Lawrence Collins, DICEY AND MORRIS ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 91 (Sweet & Maxwell, 13th ed. 2000)). The “Revenue 
Rule ‘relates only to enforcement, but it does not prevent recognition of a 
foreign [revenue] law.’” Id. at 133 (citing Albert Venn Dicey, J.H.C. Morris, & 
Lawrence Collins, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 13th ed. 2000) (emphasis added)). 
51
 Id. at 134-35. 
52
 Id. at 135-141. 
53
 Id. at 135. The Restatement states, “courts in the United States are not 
required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines or 
penalties rendered by the courts of other states.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987)). 
54
 Id. at 135.  (“The Canadian tax laws come into play only indirectly, as a factor 
to be used in the calculation of damages, and do so entirely because the RICO 
statute itself makes the Canadian law relevant to that calculation.”). 
55
 Id. at 136.  Congress created this action when they enacted RICO, which 
means “our government has determined that this suit advances our own interest, 
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competency,
56
 and the difficulty in “figuring out the meaning and 
significance of some foreign laws—especially foreign tax laws”57 
are also rebutted.  The dissent also insists the critical difference 
between civil and criminal RICO actions asserted by the majority 
opinion “founders in the face of the Supreme Court’s consistent 
refusal to treat criminal and civil RICO actions differently.”58  
European Community I & II, later Second Circuit cases, rely 
heavily on this case. 
2. Pasquantino v. United States 
 Pasquantio v. United States
59
 is a case brought by the 
United States government on behalf the Canadian government for 
a violation of the United States wire fraud statute.
60
  The 
petitioners
61
 were indicted and convicted of federal wire fraud.  
The trio carried out a scheme to defraud the Canadian government 
of liquor taxes by smuggling liquor from the United States into 
                                                                                                             
and any collateral effect furthering the governmental interests of a foreign 
sovereign is, therefore, necessarily incidental.  Id. 
56
 Id. at 136-37.  Separation of power is not a concern “whenever the legislative 
and executive branches have created the cause of action.” Id. at 137.  The goal 
of RICO “is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.”  Id.  
“To reject the application of civil RICO to the case at hand is to hamper this 
congressional objective.” Id. (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 
(1981)). 
57
 Id. Citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (Second Cir. 1997), and 
United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (Second Cir. 2000), the dissent shows two 
instances in which the Second Circuit has rejected “the rationale for the revenue 
that is based on the desire to avoid analysis of foreign statutes.” Id. at 138. 
58
 Id. at 139 (Second Cir. 2001); see Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. 
Reynolds, supra note 32, at 139. 
59
 Pasaquinto, supra note 20, at 349. 
60
 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). 
61
 Carl J. Pasquantino, David b. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts. 
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Canada.
62
  Canada had almost doubled the liquor purchasing price 
at the time of the smuggling operation by taxing liquor imported 
from the United States to Canada.
63
  Pasquantino moved to dismiss 
the wire fraud charge because the United States did not have a 
sufficient interest in enforcing Canada’s revenue laws.64  The 
District Court denied the motion and the jury convicted the 
Pasquantinos of wire fraud.
65
  The Pasquantinos appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the panel reversed the 
convictions.
66
  The Fourth Circuit reheard the case en banc and 
vacated the panel’s decision and affirmed the conviction.67  The 
Court concluded “the common-law Revenue Rule, rather than 
barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, simply allowed 
courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments . . . and therefore did 
not preclude the Government from prosecuting petitioners.”68  The 
Fourth Circuit also held Canada had a right to receive tax revenue 
as “‘money or property’ within the meaning of the wire fraud 
statute.”69  The Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari “to resolve a conflict in the Court of Appeals over 
                                                 
62
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 353. While in New York, the Pasquantinos 
ordered liquor from discount package stores in Maryland over the phone. Id. 
They hired Hilts to hid liquor in their cars and drive over the Canadian border 
without declaring the liquor or paying the required taxes. Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at 353-54.  
65
 Id. at 354. 
66
 Id. Pasquantinos argued “their prosecution contravened the common-law 
revenue rule, because it required the court to take cognizance of the revenue 
laws of Canada.” Id. 
67
 Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
68
 Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
69
 Id. (citing Pasquantino v. U.S., 336 F.3d 321, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
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whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue 
violates the wire fraud statute.”70 
 The Court first considered if the conduct committed by the 
Pasquantinos fell within the literal terms of the wire fraud statute.
71
  
Next, the Court contemplated the Revenue Rule argument.
72
  One 
of the biggest arguments against the Revenue Rule comes from the 
fact that “this is a criminal prosecution brought by the United 
States in its sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal 
conduct” not a suit to recover foreign tax liability.73  Like the 
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of indirect 
versus direct enforcement of taxes.  The Court stated, “The line the 
Revenue Rule draws between impermissible and permissible 
‘enforcement’ of foreign revenue law has therefore always been 
unclear.”74 
                                                 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 355-59. The wire fraud statute “prohibits using interstate wires to effect 
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."” Id. at 355 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000)). The Court found Canada had a property right to the 
uncollected taxes. Id. The Court also found the Pasquantinos committed a 
scheme to defraud Canada of its property and fell directly within the terms of the 
wire fraud statute. Id. at 357. 
72
 Id. at 359-70. “We are aware of no common-law revenue case decided as of 
1952 that held or clearly implied that the revenue rule barred the United States 
from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes.” Id. at 360. 
73
 Id. at 362. This is an argument used later by the Second Circuit as to why they 
declined to follow Pasquantino for a civil RICO case brought by a foreign 
country. See European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
74
 Id. at 367. “This court will not aid a foreign country in the enforcement of its 
revenue laws, it will not refuse to direct a just and equitable administration of 
that part of an estate within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would 
result in the enforcement of such revenue laws.” Id. at 367-68 (citing In re 
Hollins, 139 N.Y.S. 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 1913)). “It is sometimes difficult to draw 
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 The Court convicted Pasquantino of wire fraud.
75
  The 
majority found that the revenue rule was not a clear bar to the 
case.
76
  The Court also noted Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provided sufficient means for courts “to 
resolve the incidental foreign law issues they may encounter in 
wire fraud prosecutions.”77  The Supreme Court also stated their 
interpretation did not give the wire fraud statute extraterritorial 
effect, disputing Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in his dissent that it 
did.
78
 
 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the dissent asserting statutes 
should be domestic not extraterritorial.
79
  Ginsburg only mentioned 
the RICO statute once at the end of the dissent.
80
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
the line between an issue involving merely recognition of a foreign law and 
indirect enforcement of it.” Id. at 368 (citing ALBERT VENN DICEY, J.H.C. 
MORRIS, & LAWRENCE COLLINS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 90 (13th ed. 2000)). 
75
 Id. at 371. 
76
 Id. at 368. 
77
 Id. at 370. 
78
 Id. at 371.  The Court stated, “Petitioners used U.S. interstate wires to execute 
a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue.  Their offense was 
complete the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States . . . . 
This domestic element of petitioners’ conduct is what the Government is 
punishing . . . no less than when it prosecutes a scheme to defraud a foreign 
individual or corporation, or a foreign government acting as a market 
participant.” Id. 
79
 Id. at 373. “The Court has "adopt[ed] the legal presumption that Congress 
ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application."” 
Id. (citing Small v. United States 544 U.S. 385, at 388-89 n. 3 (2005)). 
80
 Id. at 383. “A finding that particular conduct constitutes wire fraud therefore 
exposes certain defendants to the severe criminal penalties and forfeitures 
provide in both RICO, see § 1963 (2000 ed.), and the money laundering statute, 
§ 1956(a), (b) (2000 ed. And Supp. II).” Id. 
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3. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. (EC I & II) 
 The European Community (EC)
81
 brought a claim in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
against RJR Nabisco, Inc. for lost tax revenue due to cigarette 
smuggling.
82
  After dismissal of their complaint from the district 
court due to the Revenue Rule, European Community sought an 
appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
83
 
 The Second Circuit relied heavily on their previous opinion 
in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds (Canada).
84
  The 
EC tried to distinguish its suit from by using the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001.
85
  The Second Circuit did not agree with this assertion 
and stated “the Patriot Act and its legislative history do not 
constitute the clear evidence of congressional intent necessary to 
find that Congress has abrogated the Revenue Rule.”86  The EC, 
then, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme 
                                                 
81
 The European Community consisted of the Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of 
Finland, French Republic, Hellenic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italian Republic, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
Portuguese Republic, and Kingdom of Spain. 
82
 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.2004). 
The action was “three actions treated as related and decided together.” Id. at 
128. The EC alleged the defendants “directed and facilitated contraband 
cigarette smuggling by studying smuggling routes, soliciting smugglers, and 
supplying them with cigarettes.” Id. Using forged shipping documents, the 
smugglers routed the cigarettes "so as to avoid paying the customs duties and 
excise taxes of the countries into which the cigarettes were smuggled.” Id.  
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 131-32. 
85
 Id. at 127, 136-38 (2004). “Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, which amended RICO to . . . allow foreign sovereigns to 
use RICO to impose liability on domestic tobacco companies that attempt to 
evade their revenue laws.” Id. at 127. 
86
 Id. 
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Court.
87
  The Court granted the petition, vacated the Court of 
Appeals judgment, and remanded the case back to the Second 
Circuit “for further consideration in light of Pasquantino v. United 
States.”88 
 Normally the Second Circuit is “bound by the decisions of 
prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en 
banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.”89  An exception 
arises “where there has been an intervening Supreme Court 
decision that casts doubt on [the Second Circuit’s] controlling 
precedent.”90  Using this exception rule, the Second Circuit 
reinstated its decision from EC II. 
 The Second Circuit considered Pasquantino and its impact 
on civil RICO cases.
91
  The Court pointed out the government’s 
decision to represent Canada in the case.
92
  The United States, by 
bringing the case on behalf of Canada greatly diminished the 
                                                 
87
 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005). 
88
 Id.  
89
 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
90
 Id. (citing Union of Needletrades, Indust. & Textile Empl. v. INS, 336 F.3d 
200, 210 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
91
 Id. at 180. 
92
 Id. By the government representing Canada, the Court “found ‘little risk of 
causing the principal evil against which the Revenue Rule was traditionally 
thought to guard:  judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other 
sovereigns.’” Id. (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 368 
(2005)). The action implies the Executive Branch has assessed the risk of 
pursing a case in United States courts. Id. (“We may assume that by electing to 
bring this prosecution, the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact on 
this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it poses little danger 
of causing international friction.” Id. at 181 (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 
544 U.S. 349, 368 (2005))). 
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concerns about separation of powers.
93
  The United States 
involvement served as a key factor in Pasquantino.
94
  The Second 
Circuit pointed out the United States lack of involvement as a 
crucial difference between the two cases.
95
 
 The Court also asserted Pasquantino reaffirmed the 
Circuit’s previous decisions “under which the Revenue Rule was 
held inapplicable to § 1343 smuggling prosecutions.”96  The Court 
asserted the Supreme Court decision implies a suit with a 
secondary objective “irrelevant to revenue collection might still be 
barred by the rule.”97  The substance of the claim had not changed 
and remained “that the defendants violated foreign tax laws.”98  
The Second Circuit found no reason to deviate from its previous 
decision and reinstated the verdict from EC I.
99
 
 Next, this Comment will argue that the Revenue Rule 
should be limited in scope so that it no longer bars any RICO 
claims brought by foreign countries in two ways:  by (1) never 
allowing the Revenue Rule to trump RICO claims or (2) 
completely abolishing the Revenue Rule and allowing America to 
interpret foreign countries’ tax laws.  In the alternative, this 
                                                 
93
 Id. at 181. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. “The executive branch has given us no signal that it consents to this 
litigation.” Id.  
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. at 182. The EC points out that the Supreme Court’s decision adopts a 
narrow version of the Revenue Rule. Id. at 181. The narrow version of the rule 
bars only suits “whose ‘whole object’ is the collection of foreign tax revenue.” 
Id. The Court rejected this argument. 
98
 Id. at 182. 
99
 Id. at 182-83. 
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comment contends that if the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted, 
(3) foreign countries should appeal to the United States 
government to bring these claims on their behalf. 
II. Argument 
A. Limiting the Revenue Rule 
1. Never Allowing RICO Claims to Be Banned by the 
Revenue Rule 
 In RICO cases, the Revenue Rule should be restricted so 
that it does not bar RICO claims.  Smuggling and other 
racketeering crimes occur not only in the United States but also in 
foreign countries.
100
  There are laws in place in the United States to 
protect companies and persons from smuggling, counterfeiting, 
and fraud.  We have implemented civil and criminal proceedings to 
handle these cases.  This protection should extend to foreign 
countries with which we engage in treaties and contracts.  We 
consider most of these countries allies and enter into trade 
agreements with them.
101
  This does not stop American citizens or 
corporations from engaging in the same smuggling, counterfeiting, 
and fraud we see in the United States in these foreign countries.
102
  
Since these acts occur overseas, these countries need a way to 
procure remedies from the crimes committed against them. 
                                                 
100
 See Pasquantino, supra note 20; European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 
F.3d. 123 (2d Cir. 2004). 
101
 There are some arguments for dismissing the Revenue Rule only in those 
cases in which we have a treaty with the foreign country.  Those arguments are 
outside the scope of this Comment. 
102
 See note 100. 
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 RICO allows for foreign countries to bring claims against 
these wrong doers in the United States.
103
  By allowing the 
Revenue Rule to bar these claims it effectively renders RICO 
useless in protecting these countries and deterring the very conduct 
it seeks to prohibit and outlaw.  If the Revenue Rule is to continue 
to exist in common law tradition, it needs to be limited in scope so 
as not to interfere with RICO claims brought before United States 
District Courts.  Statutory laws codified in the United States Code 
are not normally trumped by judicially made common law rules.  
One canon of statutory interpretation states, “statutes which invade 
the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the 
retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a 
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”104  RICO’s blatant 
wording allows foreign claims to be brought into the district courts 
of the United States in spite of the Revenue Rule’s long-
established principles.  RICO defines racketeering as “any act 
which is indictable under . . . . [offenses] relating to trafficking in 
contraband cigarettes . . . . any offense involving fraud . . . or . . . 
importation . . . buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a 
controlled substance or listed chemical . . . .”105  The Act goes on 
to state, “It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control 
                                                 
103
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(a) (1995); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (1970); 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1961(1)(b) (2013). 
104
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 359. 
105
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). 
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of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which 
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”106  These cases interrupt 
foreign commerce.  When cigarette and liquor smuggling rings 
commence, though most of the activities may be conducted in the 
United States, there is still wire and mail fraud transactions that not 
only cross interstate lines, but interrupt foreign commerce as well. 
 The statute “‘Speaks directly’ to the question addressed by 
the common law,” which is can the United States interpret the 
foreign laws of other states.
107
  RICO explicitly gives the United 
States the jurisdiction unbarred by the Revenue Rule to hear these 
cases brought by other countries.  In addition there is “no common-
law Revenue Rule case decided as of 1952 [the year the wire fraud 
statute was created] that held or clearly implied that the Revenue 
Rule barred the United States from prosecuting a fraudulent 
scheme to evade foreign taxes.”108  Not only does the RICO 
wording explicitly override the Revenue Rule’s intent, there is no 
case history to support the revenue barring such claims.  Around 
the time of the creation of the Revenue Rule, courts “considered 
void foreign contracts that lacked tax stamps required under 
foreign revenue law.”109  If it was not valid under the foreign court, 
it was not valid in the English courts.  The line the Revenue Rule 
                                                 
106
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(b). 
107
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 359 (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.D. 
529, 534 (1993)). 
108
 Id. at 360. 
109
 Id. at 367 (citing Alves v. Hodgson, 101 Eng. Rep. 953, 955 (K.B. 1797); 
Clegg v. Levy, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (N.P. 1812)). 
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draws has been unclear and the clarity of the RICO Act clearly 
keeps the ambiguous rule from barring its suits.   
 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 483 
states, “Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or 
to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes . . .”110  This does 
not mean that they cannot.  States are not required to deny 
enforcing foreign tax judgments.  The Restatement gives the 
United States the option of whether or not to recognize or enforce 
the judgment. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and ultimately 
the Supreme Court agreed with this idea.
111
  Quoting the Fourth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed, “the common-law Revenue 
Rule, rather than barring any recognition of foreign revenue law, 
simply allowed courts to refuse to enforce the tax judgments of 
foreign nations . . . .”112  The Revenue Rule should not become an 
easy way out for courts not to hear disputes when their citizens are 
committing crimes abroad. 
 In limiting the Revenue Rule in foreign RICO cases, it 
would be wise to look at direct versus indirect tax claims.  Because 
the revenue gives the option of whether a United States Court will 
hear a case on foreign tax issues, if the tax law is only indirectly 
related to case “as a factor to be used in the calculation of 
                                                 
110
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF TAX AND PENAL JJUDGMENTS § 483 (1987) (emphasis added). 
111
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 354-55 (citing U.S. v Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 
321, 327-29 (4th Cir. 2003).. 
112
 Id.  
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damages” it should not be barred.113  In this case, the court would 
not be interpreting foreign state’s tax laws because “the RICO 
statute itself makes [the laws] relevant to that calculation.”114  
Here, foreign sovereignties would not be asking our courts to 
interpret and enforce foreign laws; they are asking the courts to 
grant a judgment “from the violation of a United States statute.”115 
 The Revenue Rule’s philosophy is embedded in refusing 
the “obligation to further the governmental interests of a foreign 
sovereign.”116  But by hearing cases that only indirectly relate to 
foreign taxes, we would not be furthering foreign sovereignties 
interests in their states, but “further[ing] American’s sovereign 
interests [by entertaining] suits brought under federal statutes, and 
to award the damages that such statues establish.”117  Creating and 
following the RICO statutes advances American’s interests and it 
is only indirectly that foreign states may be aided.  America cannot 
pick and choose to follow her laws when they are convenient or 
they do not like the plaintiff bringing suit, she must follow the 
rules her Congress has enacted and take the cases presented before 
her, even though these decisions may inadvertently aid a foreign 
country.
118
  RICO’s primary function “is ‘not merely to 
                                                 
113
 See, Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 
268 F.3d 103, 135 (Second Cir. 2001) (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting). 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id.  
116
 Id. at 136 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting) (citing Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)). 
117
 Id.  
118
 Id. (“Whether our decision today indirectly assists [foreign states] in keeping 
smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes, is not our Court’s 
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compensate victims but . . . to [eliminate] racketeering activity.”119  
It may be “true that [United States courts] will not aid a foreign 
country in the enforcement of its revenue laws, it will not refuse to 
direct a just and equitable administration of that part of an estate 
within its jurisdiction merely because such direction would result 
in the enforcement of such revenue laws.”120  Indirectly using 
overseas tax laws to accomplish this goal does not diminish the 
Revenue Rule at all, but furthers the legitimacy of the American 
court systems.  If the Revenue Rule cannot be restricted to allow 
all foreign RICO claims to be heard, then it should be limited to 
allowing claims that only need the indirect involvement of foreign 
laws. 
 The Second Circuit in European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., stated “A claim that triggers the Revenue Rule is 
barred unless the plaintiffs establish that superior law, such as a 
federal statute that provides the applicable right of action, 
abrogates the rule in the context in which the plaintiffs seek to 
enforce their tax laws.”121  When dealing with issues that would 
impact foreign relations, the statute seeking to abrogate the 
common law “must speak directly to the matter in order to 
                                                                                                             
Concern.” (quoting United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (Second Cir. 
1997))) 
119
 Id. at 137 (citing Rotello v. Wood, 528 U.Sl 549, 557 (2000)). 
120
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 367-68 (citing In re Hollins, 79 Misc. 200, 208 
(Sur. Ct. 1913)). 
121
 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 132 (emphasis 
added) (citing Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 
Inc., 268 F.3d 103 at 113, 119, 126.).  
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abrogate it.”122  Though the Second Circuit led by Judge 
Sotomayor did not agree, RICO is a statute that explicitly 
abrogates the Revenue Rule. 
2. Should the Revenue Rule Be Abolished Completely? 
 If the Revenue Rule cannot be limited in scope it should be 
abolished in its entirety.  Though the rule is almost three hundred 
years old,
123
 it does not specifically deny courts the right to hear 
foreign tax issues.
124
  Though there is an argument that the United 
States is unable to interpret the laws of foreign states.  There is no 
evidence as to why “proving or interpreting foreign law would be 
any greater than in other civil suits involving foreign law.”125  
Implementing certain court processes easily overcomes this 
argument.  Foreign countries must provide experts as well as 
translated versions of the appropriate laws to be interpreted.  Also 
they should provide experts to testify on the legitimacy of the law.  
This poses an expensive burden on the foreign company, but if 
they are adamant in bringing claims for taxes, then this is not an 
impossible task.  The foreign country’s laws then become an issue 
of fact that must be proven before the case can proceed.  Once 
proven, the United States courts are now qualified to interpret the 
                                                 
122
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Attorney General of Canada v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 at 129). 
123
 Mallinak, supra note 3, 79. 
124
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, Supra note 110 
(“Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or enforce . . . other 
states.”). 
125
 Thomas B. Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-criminal Penal & 
Revenue Judgments in England & the United States, 16 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
663, 668 (1967). 
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laws and will proceed in the cases with adequate understanding of 
those foreign laws.  This would not be too complicated to enforce 
in courts because “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 . . . 
[sets] forth a procedure for interpreting foreign law that improves 
on those available at common law.  [I]t permits a court . . . to 
consider ‘any relevant material or source—including testimony—
without regard to the Federal Rules of Evidence.”126  There is also 
a similar rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 44.1 
states, “In determining foreign law, the court may consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not 
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on 
a question of law.”127  This would prevent one of the two concerns 
the Revenue Rule seeks to address: “policy complications and 
embarrassment [that] may follow when one nation’s courts analyze 
the validity of another nation’s tax laws.”128  The second concern is 
addressed later in this Comment. 
 The Second Circuit in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. 
Reynolds, lays out a set of criticisms for the Revenue Rule.  These 
criticisms show why the rule should no longer be used and in 
modern times have become obsolete.  Advances in laws and 
technology make it possible to arrange for easy “instantaneous 
                                                 
126
 Pasquantino, supra note 20, at 370. 
127
 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 44.1. 
128
 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
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transfer of assets.”129  In the twenty-first century, “virtually all 
states impose and collect taxes.”130  The fact that all states impose 
taxes and the ability to instantaneously transfer funds and assets 
makes enforcing judgments for foreign states much easier.  There 
is no long complicated process to transfer one parties funds in 
America to pay off the debt they owe Canada.  The rule has little 
basis and simply survives because “it [has] been in effect for [over] 
two centuries.”131  Since its appearance in 1729,132 there has been 
“scanty reasoning justifying the rule’s emergence.”133  The rule 
simply appeared with no justification and in its beginnings did not 
“provide the basis of decision.”134  If courts follow the rule as it 
was created, it should not provide the basis for decisions in these 
RICO cases when it was not originally used to do so, even if it has 
been used for hundreds of years.  Though stare decisis is typically 
the method followed by courts, centuries old traditions should be 
broken when they become no longer necessary. 
 In addition to being technologically obsolete, the Revenue 
Rule is not needed because there are “other doctrines now used to 
bar enforcement of foreign claims [that] would remain in 
                                                 
129
 Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 125 (Second 
Cir. 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, 
Reporter’s Note 2 (1987)). 
130
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 110 
(Reporter’s Note 2). 
131
 Id. 
132
 The Attorney General v. Lutwydge & Al’., 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div. 
1729). 
133
 Canada, 268 F.3d at 125. 
134
 Id. 
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effect.”135  The United States could use the principle of forum non 
conveniens to take care of certain civil cases in the absence of the 
Revenue Rule.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Law Relations 
§ 421 outlines when a state has jurisdiction to adjudicate.
136
  If 
these criteria are not met than the state cannot hear the case.  This 
is a more concrete and effective rule than the Revenue Rule.  
Section 421(1) states, “A state may exercise jurisdiction through its 
courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the 
relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make 
the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.”137  Section 421(2) details 
the qualification for a person to be tried in a state.
138
  In these 
RICO cases, if the company defendants are not United States 
citizens as classified by § 421(2)(e) then they would be barred 
from bringing the claim in the United States.
139
  There is no longer 
a need for the Revenue Rule to bar these claims.  In addition to 
forum non conveniens, “local public policy could still be 
invoked.”140  If adjudicating and enforcing a foreign judgment 
offended public policy then that justification could bar the claim.  
Changing times are forcing the Revenue Rule to retire making way 
for other measures to bar these civil RICO claims in its place. 
                                                 
135
 Stoel, supra note 125, at 668. 
136
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 (1987). 
137
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(1) (1987). 
138
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2) (1987). 
139
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(e) (1987). 
(“[T]he person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person, is organized 
pursuant to the law of the state”) Id. 
140
 Stoel, supra note 125, at 669. 
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 The Second Circuit argues that “the foreign affairs and 
separation of powers rationales for the Revenue Rule” overrides 
the many points against it.
141
  The Court specifically focuses on the 
fact that the United States and Canada have “recognized the 
vitality of the Revenue Rule and have a well-established treaty 
process that has strictly limited the extent to which each 
government can pursue its tax claims.”142  The Court does not 
address the issue of if the country bringing the claim does not have 
a treaty process established with the United States.  Treaties, as 
discussed later in this comment, are not always the best way to 
overcome the Revenue Rule.  Even if the two countries do have a 
treaty, then they would not be barred by the Revenue Rule, but by 
the four corners of the signed treaty. 
 The Revenue Rule also seems to contradict the act of state 
doctrine.  The act of state doctrine states “a court presumes the 
validity of a foreign state’s laws within that state’s territory.”143  
This in essence precludes courts in the United States from 
inquiring about the validity of a foreign state’s domestic law.144  
This law is assumed to be valid in the foreign country and it is not 
up to American courts to try and prove the law’s invalidity.  In 
opposition, “the revenue presumes the extraterritorial 
unenforceability of a foreign sovereign’s tax laws.”145  The Second 
                                                 
141
 Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 125 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
142
 Id. 
143
 Id. (citing Galu v. Swissair, 873 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
144
 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). 
145
 Canada, 268 F 3d at 125. 
  
2014]                            RACKING UP THE MONEY                             31 
Circuit disagreed that the two were completely inconsistent and 
instead sided with the idea that “the rules are consistent and 
‘represent two different ways in which courts steer clear of foreign 
affairs in different contexts.’”146  This argument when combined 
with the Supreme Court’s statements in Sabbatino, seem to provide 
the only argument in favor of the revenue not easily disputed.
147
  
The act of state doctrine arguably enables “courts to avoid 
entanglement with questions about the underlying validity of a 
foreign sovereign’s laws.”148 
 After the ruling in Sabbatino, the legislature enacted 22 
U.S.C.A. § 2370 limiting the act of state doctrine.  It disallows any 
court to “decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine 
to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the 
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or 
other rights to property is asserted by any party including a foreign 
state . . . .”149  This included “the principles of compensation . . . 
.”150  If the President determines in any case an “application of the 
act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the 
foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to 
                                                 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. at 125-26 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Peter L. F. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398, 423 (1964)). (The act of state doctrine “arises out of the basic 
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of 
powers . . . The Judicial Branch[‘s] engagement in the task of passing on the 
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s 
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in 
the international sphere”). 
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 Id. at 126. 
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 22 U.S.C.A. §2370 (2). 
150
 Id. 
  
2014]                            RACKING UP THE MONEY                             32 
this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court,” the act 
of state doctrine will be applied.
151
  This limitation helps the 
Revenue Rule trump the act of state doctrine. 
 The majority in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. 
Reynolds
152
 argues that the concern interpreting other countries’ 
statutory law is “beyond the purview of the courts of this country . 
. . [and] the pragmatic reason that it is very complicated.”153  This 
argument has been tackled and rejected by the very court which 
brought it.  In United States v. Trapilo,
154
 the Second Circuit 
undertook “the question whether a scheme . . . to defraud the 
Canadian government of tax revenue is cognizable under the 
federal wire fraud statute.”155  In that case the Revenue Rule 
provided no reason to bar the claim.
156
  “Because the statute 
prohibited schemes to defraud regardless of their success [like 
RICO], we assumed that we could find a violation without delving 
into the intricacies of Canadian law.”157  Addressing the same 
question in United States v. Pierce,
158
 the Court first established a 
property right and then, if there is a conviction, “the sentencing 
guidelines require that the sentence be imposed based on the 
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 Canada, 268 F 3d at 135. 
153
 Id. at 137 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting). 
154
 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997). 
155
 Canada, 268 F.3d at 138 (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissenting) (citing United 
States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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 Id. (Circuit Judge Calabresi dissent) (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 
547, 551 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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 Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 
552-53 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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 United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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amount of tax revenue lost.”159  These guidelines make it necessary 
to consider foreign tax laws making the Revenue Rule claims 
unneeded.  “The [sentencing] guidelines mandate this degree of 
involvement to determine . . . the existence of a RICO civil action 
and to calculate the proper damages under that action.”160  The 
Revenue Rule is no longer needed as RICO transcends the 
Revenue Rule’s boundaries and “has been effectively rejected by 
[the Second Circuit].”161  Though Trapilo and Pierce were both 
criminal cases, “there is no reason why the same courts must be 
deemed incompetent to undertake an identical analysis in civil 
RICO cases.”162  This fact is in the light “of the Supreme Court’s 
consistent refusal to treat criminal and civil RICO actions 
differently.”163  Also there has been no stated reason for the 
Revenue Rule to treat civil and criminal cases differently.
164
   
 
 
                                                 
159
 268 F.3d at 138 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Pierce, 224 
F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
160
 Id.  
161
 Id.  
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 Id. at 139. 
163
 Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting). (“The Court made clear that it would not 
interpret civil RICO narrowly in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). The Court noted that its broad 
interpretation of civil RICO ‘is amply supported by our prior cases and the 
general principles surrounding the statute.... This is the lesson not only of 
Congress's self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, ... but 
also of its express admonition that RICO is to “be literally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes.”’ Id. at 497–98 (citation omitted) (quoting 
Pub.L. 91–452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947)”). 
164
 Id. at 139. 
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B. Gaining Executive Consent, Allowing the U.S. to Try 
Foreign RICO Cases 
 The Second Circuit argues vigorously that one of the main 
differences between Pasquantino and European Community is that 
the United States was the party bringing the claim in 
Pasquantino.
165
  The Court established “the fact of the prosecution 
[in Pasquantino] implies an assessment of risk by the executive 
branch on which the courts may rely” and by bringing the 
prosecution “the Executive has assessed this prosecution’s impact 
on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded that it 
poses little danger of causing international friction.”166  Executive 
consent, therefore, is another way to circumvent the Revenue Rule 
and try foreign RICO claims. 
 Gaining executive consent in these foreign RICO cases, 
tackles the second problem the Revenue Rule seeks to address: 
“that the executive branch, not the judicial branch, should decide 
when our nation will aid others in enforcing their tax laws.”167  By 
the executive branch bringing these cases it implies “there is little 
reason to worry about infringing on the executive’s sphere of 
decision-making, and the rule will not be applied.”168  Once 
executive consent is given and the United States brings the claim, 
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 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 
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 Id. at 180-81. 
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 Id. at 180 (citing Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 
131 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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there is “little risk of causing the principal evil against which the 
Revenue Rule was traditionally thought to guard: judicial 
evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns.”169  
The United States has assessed the risk and the impact bringing a 
case of this nature may have on foreign relations.
170
  It also means 
there is “little danger of causing international friction.”171  This 
allows the suit to bypass the Revenue Rule as it will not be 
triggered in a case brought by the United States in the United 
States. 
 When the United States brings these foreign RICO cases on 
behalf of other countries it also eliminates the concern of 
separation of powers issues.
172
  The Second Circuit found that 
“where the two political branches have approved a legal action that 
may advance the policies of a foreign government, the courts do 
not overstep their authority by allowing the action to go 
forward.”173  This eliminates almost all concerns courts have had 
when considering these foreign RICO cases and it allows the 
Revenue Rule to remain intact as it has for over three centuries.
174
  
It also keeps the courts from going beyond their powers and 
dealing with “the relations between the states themselves, with 
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permission to bring a foreign RICO case but that is not covered within the scope 
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which the courts are incompetent to deal.”175  The Executive is 
more in tune to the relationships between the United States and 
other countries.  By requiring foreign states to obtain Executive 
permission and allowing them to be represented by the state, we 
bypass the problem of possibly creating international tension 
between allies.  An assumption can be made that the Executive, in 
bringing these types of prosecutions, has assessed any impact this 
type of case could have on foreign relationships “and concluded 
that it poses little danger of causing international friction.”176  
There are no common-law courts that have used the Revenue Rule 
to bar a case brought by the United States government on behalf of 
a foreign state.
177
   
 For these reasons, an alternative to the revenue barring 
foreign RICO claims, these countries should seek the aid of the 
United States government to bring their cases. 
III. Conclusion 
 With roots reaching back to the eighteenth century, the 
Revenue Rule has firmly situated itself in American jurisprudence.  
Now over three centuries later, it has become entangled in a legal 
battle with the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations 
Act of 1970 (RICO).  These two legal titans have battled in the 
United States District Courts, United States Courts of Appeals, and 
the Supreme Court.  In theory, the Revenue Rule bars civil RICO 
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claims by foreign countries denying them the remedies they seek 
after falling victim to the wrongdoings of Americans. 
 Three hundred years after its development the Revenue 
Rule has become obsolete.  This common law rule no longer has a 
place within American jurisprudence and should be released from 
legal use.  With changing technology and the evolution of 
instantaneous currency exchange, the Revenue Rule has lost its 
standing in the legal world.  Unfortunately, because of its survival 
through centuries of legal history, some feel the Revenue Rule still 
has a place in the court room.  In this case, the Revenue Rule 
should be restricted so as to never bar civil RICO claims brought 
by foreign countries seeking justice in America.  When American 
citizens or companies commit crimes abroad, the ones offended 
should be able to seek a remedy.  By allowing RICO claims to 
supersede the Revenue Rule, we allow justice to be served on the 
very people RICO seeks to punish.  As a last effort, if the Revenue 
Rule cannot be abolished or restricted, foreign countries should 
seek the assistance of the American government in bringing a case 
in the United States against their aggressors.  By bringing these 
suits, the government can assure courts that any international 
problems will be circumvented.  This also keeps courts from 
invoking the Revenue Rule. With the United States bringing the 
claim, there is no longer the issue of interpreting foreign revenue 
laws. This solves any doubts courts may have in adjudicating these 
types of cases. These options provide an ending to the ongoing 
battle between the Revenue Rule and civil RICO. 
